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This paper examines the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on innovation for estab-
lished ﬁrms. We make use of a qualitative indicator of the existence of ﬁnancial
constraints based on ﬁrms’ own assessment obtained thanks to a French speciﬁcs u r -
vey. Thus, the existence of ﬁnancial constraints for innovation is measured by a direct
indicator whereas previous studies rely on proxies (like the cash-ﬂow sensitivity) sub-
ject to interpretation problems. The descriptive analysis of balance sheet structures
reveals that innovative ﬁrms without ﬁnancial constraints have the best proﬁle in
terms of economic performances, ﬁnancing structure and risk whereas non innovative
ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints have the poorest proﬁle. From the econometric point
of view, the probabilities of implementing innovative projects and of facing ﬁnancial
constraints are simultaneously estimated by a recursive bivariate probit model to
account for the endogeneity of the ﬁnancial constraint variable. We then ﬁnd that
ﬁrms having innovative projects face ﬁnancial constraints that signiﬁcantly reduce
the likelihood that they implement their innovative investment. The probability of
facing ﬁnancing constraints is explained by ﬁrms’ ex ante ﬁnancing structure and
economic performances, by industry sector and it decreases with ﬁrms’ size.
Keywords: innovation, ﬁnancing constraints, recursive bivariate probit
Résumé
Cet article étudie l’eﬀet de la présence des contraintes ﬁnancières sur l’innovation
au sein de ﬁrmes établies. Nous nous appuyons sur un indicateur qualitatif de la
présence de contraintes ﬁnancières obtenu auprès des ﬁrmes elles-mêmes par le biais
d’une enquête spéciﬁque sur le ﬁnancement de l’innovation (FIT, SESSI). La présence
de contraintes ﬁnancières est donc mesurée ici par un indicateur direct alors que
les travaux antérieurs s’appuyent sur des proxies, en particulier sur la sensibilité
de l’investissement au cash-ﬂow. L’analyse descriptive de la structure des bilans
met en évidence que les ﬁrmes innovantes non contraintes ﬁnancièrement présentent
globalement le meilleur proﬁl en termes de performances économiques, structures de
ﬁnancement et risque. A contrario, ces indicateurs se révèlent les moins bons pour
les ﬁrmes contraintes ﬁnancièrement et qui n’ont pas entrepris de projet innovant.
Du point de vue économétrique, la probabilité d’entreprendre un projet innovant
et celle de faire face à des contraintes ﬁnancières pour l’innovation sont estimées
simultanément par un probit bivarié récursif aﬁn de tenir compte de l’endogénéité
de la variable de contrainte ﬁnancière. Nous trouvons alors que les ﬁrmes souhaitant
innover rencontrent des contraintes ﬁnancières qui diminuent signiﬁcativement leur
probabilité d’entreprendre leurs projets innovants. La probabilité d’être confronté
à des contraintes ﬁnancières pour l’innovation est expliquée par les performances
économiques et la structure de ﬁnancement ex ante de la ﬁrme et elle décroit avec la
taille de la ﬁrme.
Mots clés: innovation, contraintes ﬁnancières, probit bivarié récursif









































61I N T R O D U C T I O N
As it is largely stressed in the theoretical literature, the realization of innovative
projects is very likely to undergo ﬁnancial constraints. Indeed, funding such projects
with external ﬁnance is diﬃcult and costly to ﬁrms due to the strong information
asymmetry associated with such innovative investments (Hall 2002, Schroth and Sza-
lay 2004). However, the empirical evidence about the impact of these constraints on
innovation is quite sparse and not as conclusive as one might expect. A ﬁrst strand in
this empirical literature rely on R&D investment models where additional variables
such as cash-ﬂow are considered to account for ﬁnancial constraints. Although a num-
ber of studies ﬁnd a signiﬁcant cash-ﬂow eﬀect on R&D investments by ﬁrms (e.g.
see Himmelberg and Petersen 1994, Mulkay et al. 2001), this conclusion does not
always hold (e.g. see Harhoﬀ 1998 or Bond et al. 1999 for German ﬁrms). Moreover,
it has been stressed that investment cash-ﬂow sensitivity may not be always inter-
preted as revealing the existence of ﬁnancial constraints (see Kaplan and Zingales
1997 and 2000). A second strand in the literature aims at modeling ﬁrms’ propen-
sity to innovate. This literature identiﬁes four predominant factors (Cohen and Levin
1989). Some of these determinants are ﬁrm speciﬁc( a sﬁrms size and their monopoly
power), others relate to environmental factors linked to the market (“demand pull”)
or to technological opportunities (“technology push”). Quite surprisingly, papers
estimating the probability that a ﬁrm undertakes innovative activities often ignore
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing conditions (e.g. see Crépon et al. 1998 and 2000, Mohnen and
Therrien 2002, Lööf and Heshmati 2002). Indeed, there are very few studies that
a c c o u n tf o rt h ee x i s t e n c eo fﬁnancial constraints (Czarnitzki 2005) and, when they
do so, they mainly use ﬁrms’ cash-ﬂows or past proﬁtability as proxies for ﬁnancial
constraints (see Bond et al. 1999, Harris et al. 2003).
This article aims at directly estimating the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on
innovation decisions. Our empirical analysis takes partially up the framework of
Crépon et al. (1998, 2000) which is used in several recent studies (Janz et al. 2003,
Jans and Peters 2002). However, we depart from this framework in two respects.
First, we focus only on the ﬁrst step of their model: the decision to engage into
innovative activities. Second, we put a particular stress on the role of ﬁnancial
factors on ﬁrms decisions, which was not done in their paper. For that purpose,
w eu s eas u r v e ya b o u tt h eﬁnancing of innovation by French manufacturing ﬁrms
that allows to avoid the diﬃculties associated with the cash-ﬂow sensitivity measure
(Kaplan and Zingales 1997). As far as we know, it is the ﬁrst time that such a direct
information based on ﬁrm’s own assessment is used to characterize the existence of
ﬁnancial constraints for innovation. We ﬁnd that, indeed, the existence of ﬁnancial
constraints signiﬁcantly reduces the likelihood that a ﬁrm will undertake innovative
projects. In addition, our results conﬁrm those of previous works about the traditional
determinants of innovation: the likelihood that a ﬁrm implements innovative projects
diﬀers across industries, it increases with its market share and with the importance
of the technology push. Concerning ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing problems for innovation, our
results shows that the existence of ﬁnancing constraints decreases with ﬁrm size. It is









































6as by ﬁrm’s industry sector. Moreover, from a more technical point of view, we show
that the existence of ﬁnancial constraints is endogenous to the decision to engage
into an innovative project. Consequently, a recursive bivariate probit model has to
be considered to account for simultaneity as well as for unobservable heterogeneity
that aﬀects both the decision to undertake innovative projects and the existence of
ﬁnancial constraints.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the theoretical and
empirical background. Section 3 describes the data sets: the data sources as well as
some descriptive statistics on ﬁrms balance sheet structure are presented. Section
4 exposes the econometric models and discusses the estimation results. Section 5
concludes.
2 FIRMS’ DECISION TO INNOVATE: THEORETI-
CAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
Due to informational asymmetries with external investors, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it diﬃcult
and costly to raise external funds for their investments ﬁnancing (Myers and Majluf
1984). Another possible explanation of the diﬀerence between the costs of external and
internal funds lies in moral hazard problems caused by the separation of ownership
and management (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In the case of innovative investments,
ﬁnancing constraints may be more severe. In fact, innovative investments present
special features that increase the risk and reinforce the informational problems with
external investors. The uncertainty linked to the ﬁnal output of an innovative project
may be important and this makes innovative investments particularly risky. More-
over, in general, external investors have no speciﬁc knowledge to properly evaluate
the impact of a new product or production process on a ﬁrm development. Given
their ﬁrm-speciﬁc nature, innovative projects may indeed be viewed as inducing high
transaction costs of which ﬁnancial constraints are a counter-part (Williamson 1988).
These projects constitute speciﬁc assets which present sunk costs that may have
relatively little value beyond their use in the context of a speciﬁc ﬁrm/transaction.
Moreover, innovative investments contain a large part of intangible assets (such as
R&D expenses, payment of wages of highly educated engineers...) which cannot be
used as collateral value to secure ﬁrms’ borrowing. Consequently, this weakens ﬁrms
ﬁnancial reliability from the external investors’ point of view. Those asymmetric
information problems and the uncertainty about the project output can even induce
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Williamson 1987).
Empirically, the existence of ﬁnancial constraints for innovative ﬁr m si sm o s t
frequently investigated by examining the sensitivity of R&D investment to ﬁnancial
factors (Himmelberg and Petersen 1994, Harhoﬀ 1998, Mulkay et al. 2001). It is
estimated by using the same models as for physical investment (see Mairesse et al.
1999), that is to say, by using the reduced form of accelerator models of investment (
Fazzari et al. 1988, Bond et al. 1997) or by using the structural framework of Euler
equations (Bond and Meghir 1994). Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) ﬁnd a large









































6in high-tech industries. Similar results are obtained by Mulkay et al. (2001) with
F r e n c ha n dU n i t e dS t a t e sﬁrms. In addition, they ﬁnd, that cash-ﬂow has a much
larger impact on R&D investment for US ﬁrms than for the French ones. Harhoﬀs’
results about German ﬁrms are less conclusive. He ﬁnds a weak but signiﬁcant cash-
ﬂow eﬀect on R&D by using an investment accelerator model, while Euler-equation
estimates appear to be not informative. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000)
show that investment cash-ﬂow sensitivity may not be always interpreted as revealing
the existence of ﬁnancial constraints. Cash-ﬂow provides information about future
investment opportunities; thus, investment cash-ﬂow sensitivity may equally occur
because ﬁrms are sensitive to demand signals.
Otherwise, there are some studies looking at the impact of ﬁnancial constraints
on ﬁrms’ decision to undertake innovative activities. Bond et al. (1999) look in
particular at the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrms’ propensity to innovate
by examining cash-ﬂows’ eﬀect. They do ﬁnd that cash-ﬂows have a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood that British ﬁrms perform R&D whereas this eﬀect
is non signiﬁcant for German ﬁrms. With Australian ﬁrms, Harris et al. (2003) use
past proﬁtability to account for the existence of ﬁnancing constraints but they do
not ﬁnd that it has a signiﬁcant impact on the probability to innovate. In Czarnitzki
(2005) a tobit model is estimated to evaluate the role of ﬁnancial constraints on R&D
expenditure of small and medium sized German ﬁrms. A proxy for internal funds
available accounts for internal ﬁnancing constraints and a credit rating index is used
to measure ﬁnancing constraints with external suppliers of funds. As a result, this
paper gives empirical evidence of the existence of ﬁnancing constraints aﬀecting R&D
expenditure. More often, the literature about innovation decisions stresses the role
of ﬁrm’s size as proxy to the existence of ﬁnancial constraints (Cohen and Klepper
1996). This can be explained by the importance of sunk costs linked to innovation
investments. Large ﬁrms are more incited to engage in innovative activities because
they can amortize these costs by selling more units of output. In addition, it may be
easier to ﬁnance innovative investment in large ﬁrms which are well-known and may
enjoy better relations with external investors or lenders. Thus, Crépon et al. (1998)
ﬁnd a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect of ﬁrm size on the likelihood to undertake R&D.
Other factors aﬀecting the propensity to innovate have been emphasized by the
literature. The impact of market structure on innovation is examined by several
authors (Schumpeter 1942, Arrow 1962, Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980, Aghion et al.
2002). Schumpeter (1942) argues that a ﬁrm is incited to innovate if it enjoys a
monopoly position because it would be worried about the entry of potential rivals.
But Arrow (1962) shows that under perfect ex-post appropriation, the proﬁtm a r -
gins are larger in an ex-ante competitive industry than under a monopoly situation.
In this respect, the recent empirical studies are not in contradiction to the Schum-
peterian theory. Blundell et al. (1999) ﬁnd a positive relationship between ﬁrms’
ex ante market share and innovation (measured by headcount innovations as well
as patents). Thus, Aghion et al. (2002) propose a model with an inverted U-shape
relationship between innovation and competition. In this model, competition may









































6innovate for laggards. Concerning the role of ﬁrm’s environment, Rosenberg (1974)
argues that technological opportunities determine ﬁrm’s decision to undertake inno-
vative projects. The technological opportunities may result from the past history
of knowledge accumulation and from the technological progress in the ﬁrm’s envi-
ronment. As a result, they depend on various factors such as the diﬀusion process
of knowledge, the state of art, relationship between ﬁrms or cooperation between
ﬁrms and universities. So, the existence of technological opportunities may induce
variations in ﬁrms’ ability to innovate within an industry. The demand pull is an-
other external factor which may lead innovation (Schmookler 1966). This approach
identiﬁes consumer’s needs as driving new products or processes. From an empirical
point of view, the main problem is to characterize the existence of technological op-
portunities and to deﬁne the latent demand. Empirical evidences of the role of the
technologic push and of the demand pull are obtained by using qualitative indicators
based on ﬁrm’s own assessment (Barlet et al. 1998, Crépon et al. 1998).
Now, let us present the database used to estimate the impact of ﬁnancial con-
straints on ﬁrms’ decision to innovate as well as some descriptive statistics.
3 INNOVATION, FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND
BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURE: A BRIEF DESCRIP-
TIVE ANALYSIS
3.1 Presentation of the datasets
We use data from two sources: a survey about the ﬁnancing conditions of innovative
projects for established manufacturing ﬁr m sa n dt h eB a n q u ed eF r a n c eB a l a n c eS h e e t
Data.
The survey we used, named “Financement de l’Innovation Technologique” (FIT)
was conducted in 2000 by the French Ministry of Industry. Its aim was to obtain sta-
tistical information about the ﬁnancing conditions of innovative projects of manufac-
turing ﬁrms in France. This survey allows to identify the ﬁrms which undertook inno-
vative projects between 1997 and 1999 and it gives qualitative information about the
ﬁnancial constraints that ﬁrms may have experienced when planning and conducting
those projects. A sample of 5500 industrial companies was surveyed. It is composed
by manufacturing ﬁrms with 20 employees and more (excluding agricultural-food and
building sectors). It is important to notice that start-ups and new established ﬁrms
are not in the ﬁeld of this survey. Globally, the rate of response amounts to 70%
(Sessi 2002) so that about 3700 ﬁrms are present in the available FIT sample.
As the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS), the FIT survey is based upon the
technological innovation concept exposed in the Oslo manual (OECD 1997). The
identiﬁcation of ﬁrms that conduct an innovative project is made thanks to their
answers to the three following questions:
1) In 1997, 1998 or 1999, did Your enterprise introduce onto the market any new









































62) In 1997, 1998 or 1999, did Your enterprise introduce onto the market any new
or signiﬁcantly improved process for Your enterprise?
3) In 1997, 1998 or 1999, had Your enterprise projects of new or signiﬁcantly
improved products or processes:
- Which are not yet completed or not yet introduce to the market?
- Which were failures?
We consider that a ﬁrm has implemented innovative projects if it answered posi-
tively to at least one of these three questions.
In addition, the survey gives a qualitative information about the existence of
ﬁnancing constraints. This indicator is exposed and discussed in section 3.2.
In order to have more information about the surveyed ﬁrms (their size, economic
performance and ﬁnancing structure) we use the Banque de France Balance Sheet
Dataset.1 This is a database containing essentially very detailed accounting data of
French companies, obtained from their ﬁscal forms plus some complementary ques-
tionnaires. The database includes all businesses with more than 500 employees and
a fraction of smaller ﬁrms so that the member ﬁrms amount to around 34,000 com-
panies. It achieves an overall coverage rate of 57% in industry (in terms of number
of employees). This rich database is used by the Banque de France to update knowl-
edge of the structure and performance of the French productive system. In addition,
it makes it possible for example, to pinpoint sources of ﬁnancing, to isolate group
ﬁnancing or to identify expenditures in intangible goods and services.
Our sample results from the matching of these two sources. We were able to
recover about 60% of the FIT sample companies. After some necessary cleaning, our
sample contains 1940 ﬁrms.2
3.2 The measure of the existence of ﬁnancial constraints for inno-
vation
Previous papers about investment rely on ap r i o r icriterions to discriminate between
likely ﬁnancially constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. This methodology was ini-
tialized by Fazzari et al. (1989) and use ﬁrm size and the dividends distribution
to identify likely ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. In the literature, the existence of ﬁ-
nancing constraints is also taken into account by indirect indicators (Ploetscher and
Rottmann 2002, Czarnitzki 2005). In these both studies, qualitative measures of
the existence of ﬁnancing constraints are used to study their impact respectively on
investment and on R&D expenditure. Ploetscher and Rottmann (2002) deﬁne the
existence of ﬁnancing constraints for investment according to the use of trade credit
which is considered as one of the most expensive external ﬁnancing source: ﬁrms
declaring that they use always or often trade credit are considered to be ﬁnancially
constrained. In Czarnitzki (2005), the measure of the existence of external ﬁnancing
constraints is given by a credit-rating index. As mentioned by the author, ﬁrms with
1The "Centrale de bilans" dataset.
2The manufacture of coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel has been deleted because
only two ﬁrms were present in the merged dataset. In addition, the ﬁrms with negative added value









































6bad credit rating index will have higher costs for accessing to external ﬁnance than
others. Nevertheless, this variable gives the judgment made by external examiners on
the ﬁrm ﬁnancial reliability but it does not characterize the actual ﬁnancing problems
met by the ﬁrm for its R&D investment. In addition, it may be possible that globally
a ﬁrm obtains a good rating but that external investors or lenders may be reluctant
to give funds for a speciﬁc R&D investment. Kalckreuth (2004) studies the impact
of ﬁnancial constraints on the distribution on investment over time and he relies on
survey data that identify ﬁnancing diﬃculties for investment of German ﬁrms. Thus,
this article relies on a direct measure of the existence of ﬁnancial constrained given
by the ﬁrms themselves but it does not speciﬁcally deals with innovation.
Thus, except Kalckreuth’s paper, previous studies dealing with the ﬁnancing of
investment are mainly based on proxies of the existence of ﬁnancing constraints.
H e r e ,w eu s ead i r e c tm e a s u r eo fﬁnancial hampering factors for innovation given
by the ﬁrms themselves. Indeed, in the FIT survey, ﬁrms were asked if they met
obstacles that prevented them to lead or to undertake innovative projects. Among
the obstacles listed in the survey, there are three expressions of the existence of
ﬁnancing constraints:3
-n oﬁnancing source
- slowness in the setting up of the ﬁnancings
- too high interest rates of the ﬁnancings
We consider that a ﬁrm faced ﬁnancial constraints for its innovative projects if it
answered that it had projects which were delayed, abandoned or non started because
of at least one of the three obstacles listed above.
It may be argued that indicators about innovation hampering factors that are
based on ﬁrm’s assessments have a likely drawback: it is possible that ﬁrms which
have implemented innovative projects are less reluctant to give details about the diﬃ-
culties they have encountered when running these projects than ﬁrms which were not
able to start any innovative project. However, this direct information allows to avoid
the interpretation problems of indirect indicators, especially cash-ﬂow. Moreover it
provides a speciﬁc (and new) information about the ﬁnancial problems encountered
by ﬁrms for innovative projects whereas accounting variables or credit rating index
reﬂect the global ﬁnancial situation of the ﬁrm.
In our sample, for the quasi-totality of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, the ﬁnancing
constraint simply lies in the absence of external ﬁnancing sources (see table 1). On
top of that, 45% of the ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints declared having suﬀered
from the slowness in the setting up of the ﬁnancing and about 22% claim they have
faced too high interest rates.4 The existence of ﬁnancing constraints mainly induced
the projects to be non started (for 55.43% of constrained ﬁrms) or delayed (44.86%
of constrained ﬁrms).
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3It is worth noticing that ﬁrms were allowed to tick more than one answer.










































The survey gives information about ﬁnancial constraints and other innovation obsta-
cles:
- Excessive perceived economic risk
-L a c ko fq u a l i ﬁed personnel
- Innovation costs too high
- Excessive get out clause in the shareholder agreement
- Lack of knowledge about ad hoc ﬁnancial networks
By considering the existence of all innovation obstacles listed in the survey, the
surveyed sample can be divided into ﬁve types of ﬁrms:
1. Firms which undertake innovative projects despite ﬁnancial constraints
(and eventually some other innovation obstacles). We deﬁne this category as type 1.
2. Innovative ﬁrms without ﬁnancial constraints (but which may eventually
face other non ﬁnancial obstacles). We deﬁne this category as type 2.
3. Non innovative ﬁrms encountering ﬁnancial constraints (and eventually
some other innovation obstacles). We deﬁne this category as type 3.
4. Non innovative ﬁrms without ﬁnancial constraint but which face other
non ﬁnancial innovation obstacles. We deﬁne this category as type 4.
5. Non innovative ﬁrms without any innovation obstacles. We deﬁne this
category as type 5.
The four ﬁrst categories are composed of ﬁrms having innovative projects: some
of them succeed in implementing them (type 1 and type 2) and the other ones fail
to start their innovative project (type 3 and type 4). Thus, these four types of ﬁrms
may be deﬁned as "potentially innovative".
The last category (type 5) contains ﬁrms without innovative projects and conse-
quently, which do not face ﬁnancial constraints for innovation. In other words, as
these ﬁrms do not want to innovate, they are not concerned by innovation hampering
factors.
The distribution of ﬁrms according to these categories is shown in table 2.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
3.4 Some descriptive statistics
The overall proportion of ﬁrms that can be considered to be engaged into innovative
activities is, in our sample, 41.80%.
Among the ﬁrms having innovative projects, these which succeeded in imple-
menting them appear to suﬀer more often (proportionally) from ﬁnancial constraints
(about 18.30%) than do non-innovative ﬁrms (about 10.35%).
From table 3, we can notice that established ﬁrms with implemented innovative
projects are larger than the other ones.









































6By looking at sector-based ﬁgures, we can see that the fraction of innovative/non-
innovative ﬁr m sa sw e l la st h a to fﬁnancially constrained/unconstrained ﬁrms vary a
lot across manufacturing sectors.
[[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The electrical and electronic equipment industry is characterized by the highest
rate of innovative ﬁrms (68.02%) whereas the wood and wood products industry and
the textile industry have the lowest (respectively 26.79% and 27.52%). These diﬀer-
ences between manufacturing sectors are quite similar to those observed in terms of
ﬁnancial constraints. While, on average, 17.25 % of the ﬁrms suﬀer from ﬁnancing
constraints, this proportion amounts to 30.18% in the electrical and electronic equip-
ment sector and to 27.68% in the transport equipment industry. It is only about 9%
in the wood and wood products industry and around 11.11% in the leather industry,
both industries being globally less innovative.
In order to identify possible diﬀerences in the risk of each type of ﬁrm, we have
examined the industry score constructed by the Banque de France (Bardos 1998).
It is a composite indicator of company risk and consists of a linear combination of
symptomatic ratios such as the proﬁtability, solvency, debt and cash ratios. This
indicator is constructed such as lower the score, the riskier the company’s position
and is used as a tool by the Banque de France to establish an individual ﬁnancial
diagnosis.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Unlike Planès et al. (2002), we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences concerning the risk of
the ﬁrms which may seem quite surprising (Table 5): innovative ﬁrms are less risky
than non innovative ones. By considering the existence of ﬁnancial constraints, a
hierarchy in terms of risk can be established. The less risky ﬁrms appear to be those
with implemented innovative projects and being ﬁnancially unconstrained; but at the
same time, innovative ﬁrms facing ﬁnancing constraints are riskier than unconstrained
ﬁrms without innovative activities. The ﬁrms facing ﬁnancing constraints and which
do not undertake innovative project are the riskiest ones. Finally, we can notice that
the group of ﬁrms not interested in innovation (type 5) enjoys a good risk indicator.
In order to try to understand these diﬀerences, let us examine ﬁrms’ balance sheet
structure5 depending on the possible existence of ﬁnancial constraints and/or that of
innovative nature (e.g. Planès et al. 2002).
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
5The descriptive statistics relative to corporate balance sheets are calculated by accounting for
composition eﬀects: in order to neutralize size and sector eﬀects, the average variables for the ﬁve









































6Investment signiﬁcantly diﬀers across each type of ﬁrm, especially as regards in-
tangible investment6 (table 6). As expected, innovative ﬁrms and particularly the
ﬁnancially constrained ones have a higher immaterial expenditures ratio (immater-
ial expenditures divided by added value). It amounts to 6.19% for ﬁnancially con-
strained innovative ﬁrms and to 4.00% for non innovative unconstrained ﬁrms. These
diﬀerences are mainly explained by the R&D expenditures. Larger immaterial ex-
penditures for innovative ﬁrms is a risk factor which may induce some reluctance of
external investors to bring funds.
Another interesting feature is the existence of an apparent hierarchy between each
category of ﬁrms concerning their ability to earn proﬁts. It may be established by
various income ratios such as the gross operating proﬁt margin, the share of ﬁnancial
fees in added value or the self ﬁnancing capacity ratios (table 6). Not surprisingly,
the ﬁrms without ﬁnancial constraints seem to perform better than the ﬁnancially
constrained ones. In addition, in each case, innovative ﬁrms have better ratios than
non innovative ones whether or not they face ﬁnancial constraints.
Some papers about investment and ﬁnancing constraints use the dividends dis-
tribution to discriminate between likely ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms and likely un-
constrained ones (for instance Fazzari et al. 1988). Our data are coherent with this
idea: the share of dividends distribution in the added value of non constrained ﬁrms
(4.97% for the innovative ones and 3.07% for the non innovative ones) is higher than
the average ratio of the constrained ﬁrms (2.40% for the innovative ﬁrms and 2.60%
for non innovative ﬁrms).
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The ﬁnancing structure conﬁrms the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between each type of
ﬁrms in terms of ﬁnancial reliability (Table 7). Own ﬁnancing and ﬁnancial debt
are discriminating factors when comparing the innovation behavior and the ﬁnancial
constraints of the diﬀerent categories of ﬁrms. The average share of own ﬁnancing in
the total sources of funds (measured as the sum of own ﬁnancing, market ﬁnancing
and ﬁnancial debt) varies between 78.80% for unconstrained innovative ﬁrms and
67.12% for non innovative ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints. In the same way, ﬁnancial
debt represents only 21.19% of the total source of funds for innovative ﬁrms without
ﬁnancial constraints while it amounts to 32.88% for non innovative ﬁrms having
ﬁnancing constraints. By analyzing the components of the ﬁnancial debt, we can see
that these diﬀerences come from bank loans (and especially short term bank loans
which are an indicator of ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial fragility) and from the other extra-group
ﬁnancial debt, while the ﬁnancing by the group (when relevant) does not appear
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the categories of ﬁrms. For instance, the ﬁrms which
6The French tax code states that companies are free to book operating expenditure for scientiﬁc
or technical research either as ﬁxed assets or as expenses. The Banque de France Sheet data Oﬃce
separates oﬀ some items of the expenditure book as expenses, which makes it possible to reincorporate
these expenditures within intangible investment. Nevertheless, it remains a part of the expenses,









































6undertake innovative projects and which do no have ﬁnancial constraints use only
5.96% of their total source of funds as short term bank loans, whereas it represents
8.82% for constrained innovative ﬁrms and 13.74% for non innovative ﬁrms facing
ﬁnancial constraints.
Thus, as it was showed by Planès et al. (2002), innovative ﬁrms enjoy a better
ﬁnancial situation than non innovative ones, everything else being equal. This is
consistent with the idea that there is a sort of selectivity concerning the decision to
innovate for the ﬁrms which perform better (Bond et al. 1999).
Now, the following section proposes to properly evaluate whether ﬁnancing con-
straints aﬀect ﬁrms’ decision to innovate.
4E C O N O M E T R I C R E S U L T S
In this econometric analysis, ﬁnancing problems are alternatively taken into account
by proxies (as it was done in the earlier literature) and by our qualitative variable
specifying the existence of ﬁnancial constraints for ﬁrm’s innovative projects. From
the econometric point of view, two speciﬁcations are used to model the role of ﬁnan-
cial factors in the decision to innovate: a simple probit model and then a bivariate
recursive probit that accounts for the likely endogeneity of our qualitative indicator
of ﬁnancial constraints.
4.1 Innovation decisions with proxies of the existence of ﬁnancial
constraints
Following Crépon et al (1998), we ﬁrst deﬁne a univariate probit where the decision
to implement an innovative project depends on “traditional” determinants of the
decision to innovate emphasized by the literature like the ﬁrm size, its market power,
technological push and demand pull indicators. However, we supplement the model
by adding ﬁnancial variables to account for possible ﬁnancial constraints.
In other words, we specify the latent variable y∗
1i underlying this probit model as:
y∗
1i = x1ia1 + zia2 + ui. (1)
T h el a t e n tv a r i a b l ey∗
1i can be interpreted as reﬂecting the expected return of
ﬁrm’s innovative projects. In x1i, the “traditional” determinants of innovation are
included and zi accounts for ﬁnancial determinants of innovation.
More precisely, x1i includes:
- ﬁrm’s size measured as the logarithm of the number of employees, in order to
allow for a non linear relationship;
- ﬁrm’s market power measured as the share of the ﬁrm’s sales in the total sales
of the sector;
- technology push indicators. The importance of technological opportunities is
given by a qualitative measure issued from the FIT survey. The same indicator was









































6In the survey, the ﬁrms are asked :“Do You consider that Your market is techno-
logically : not innovative? weakly innovative? moderately innovative? or strongly
innovative?”. We take the ﬁrst level “not innovative“ as reference and include in the
regression three dummy variables TP2, TP3 and TP4 for the other levels. We expect
a positive impact of these technologic push variables, increasing with the intensity of
innovation opportunities.
- Industry dummies according to French classiﬁcation NAF037. The manufacture
of electrical and electronic equipment is taken as reference. As we mentioned earlier,
this sector is characterized by the highest percentage of innovative ﬁrms. We expect
the coeﬃcients of these dummies to be negative8. As the survey does not give in-
formation about the demand pull, the industry dummies account for demand eﬀect
proper to an industry. They also account for diﬀerences of risk across sectors.
As proxies for ﬁnancing problems, we use cash-ﬂow, the Banque de France risk
companies indicator and some accounting ﬁnancial variables from the Banque de
France Balance Sheet Dataset. These ﬁnancial accounting variables are the follow-
ings:
- the share of the banking debt,
- the share of the own ﬁnancing in the ﬁrm’s total ﬁnancing resources9.
These variables reﬂect ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing structure. A weak ﬁnancing structure
(i.e. small own ﬁnancing ratio or high banking debt ratio) may induce ﬁnancing
constraints, and thus may hamper innovation.
- the logarithm of the amount of tangible assets accounts for the collateral that
the ﬁrm is able to provide to obtain banking loans.
- the economic performance of the ﬁrm as measured by the gross operating proﬁt
margin ratio. A ﬁrm having low past proﬁt margin may face ﬁnancing constraints
and then, may have diﬃculties to run innovative projects.
Let us remind that in the FIT survey ﬁrms were asked about their innovative
behavior and possible constraints over the years 1997-1999. To ensure that there is
no time inconsistency in the deﬁnition of the dependent variable and the regressors,
the latter are taken at their value measured ex ante,i n1 9 9 6 . M o r e o v e r ,w er u n
the estimations on the subsample including only potentially innovative ﬁrms: we
exclude the ﬁrms without innovative projects and thus which cannot face innovation
hampering factors (ﬁrms of type 5)10.
4.1.1 Firm size as a proxy for ﬁnancial problems
The ﬁrst column of table 9 shows the results obtained with the same type of speciﬁca-
tion as Crépon et al. (1998). All signiﬁcant estimates present the expected sign and
we obtain very similar results as Crépon et al. (1998). We ﬁnd that the probability of
7This French classiﬁcation is closed to the NACE.
8It would be interesting to know how past decisions about innovation and past ﬁnancing con-
straints aﬀect the present ones. Unfortunately, there are no available panel data with this informa-
tion.
9See variables deﬁnition in appendices (table 10).









































6undertaking innovative projects increases with ﬁrm’s size, with its market share and
with technology push indicators. Moreover, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across
sectors.
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
In the FIT survey we have no information to construct demand pull indicator as
it was done by Crépon et al. (1998). In order to try to account for demand eﬀect,
we have introduced the growth rate of sales of the ﬁrm between 1996 and 1997. But
we do not obtain a signiﬁcant estimate. However, as mentioned earlier, the industry
dummies allow to control for speciﬁcd e m a n de ﬀect in each industry sector.
In this context of technological innovation, past R&D investment is probably a
relevant factor explaining the innovation function. We introduce the past R&D ex-
penditure (of the year 1996) in our innovation equation (second column of table 9). It
is measured as the logarithm of the ﬁrm’s R&D investment. For ﬁrms without R&D
activity, we set this variable to zero. In addition, as Mairesse and Cuneo (1985), we
introduce a dummy variable indicating whether the ﬁrm perform R&D activity or
not. But, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the R&D investment. We suspect that
it is due to measurement errors of our R&D variable. In general, French accounting
data are not relevant to measure R&D investment because the French tax code states
that companies are free to book operating expenditure for scientiﬁc or technical re-
search either as ﬁxed assets or as expenses. The Banque de France Sheet data Oﬃce
separates oﬀ some items of the expenditure book as expenses, which makes it pos-
sible to reincorporate these expenditures within intangible investment. However, a
likely problem of measurement errors of our R&D variable has to be considered when
estimating our innovation equation. We try to account for this problem by using the
two step conditional maximum likelihood approach proposed by Rivers and Vuong
(1988): we regress our R&D investment variable on some explaining factors and then
include the estimated residuals of this regression in the probit innovation equation
(table 10). Unfortunately, we do not have good information about factors explaining
ﬁrms R&D investment of the year 1996. We use sector dummies, an indicator of the
innovative position of the ﬁrm in comparison with its reference market (that is given
by the survey) and the growth rate of ﬁrm sales between 1995 and 1996.
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
By doing that, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of R&D investment on the
likelihood to implement innovative projects. Unfortunately, using past variables (ie,
before 1996) leads to reduce our sample from 1082 ﬁrms to 905 ﬁrms because we do
not have this information for all ﬁrms. Moreover the estimation of the R&D equation
cannot be considered as satisfactory. In particular, we obtain a very poor indicator
of goodness of ﬁt. It is due to the use of a linear estimation (OLS) whereas R&D
investment is characterized by null value for non participants. So, we decide to not










































64.1.2 Cash-ﬂow and other ﬁnancial and economic variables
In table 11, we introduce cash-ﬂow as an indicator of the existence of ﬁnancial con-
straints and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. Although the marginal eﬀect seems to
be small (0.0022 at the sample mean), the estimated coeﬃcient is strongly signiﬁcant
and the marginal eﬀect is larger for small and medium sized ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms
(respectively 0.0025 and 0.0006). Thus, this cash-ﬂow eﬀect may reﬂect the existence
of ﬁnancial constraints signiﬁcantly aﬀecting innovation.
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]
In the second column of table 11, variables reﬂecting the ﬁrms’ ex ante ﬁnancing
conditions and economic performance are used to take into account likely ﬁnancing
problems for innovation. We ﬁnd that getting strongly into banking debt reduces
the likelihood of implementing innovative projects. In addition, the economic perfor-
mances (measured by the operating proﬁt margin ratio) seem to have a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on the probability of undertaking innovative projects. Nevertheless,
the proﬁt margin may be endogenous as past innovation behavior may lead to enjoy
higher proﬁt margin. Thus, we use the Rivers and Vuong approach by regressing
the gross operating proﬁt margin on the lags of an investment rate ratio (investment
divided by added value of the year 1995) and of past self-ﬁnancing capacity ratio and
industry dummies. The Lagrange multiplier test does not reject the exogeneity of
the gross operating proﬁt margin, and the two steps conditional maximum likelihood
estimation conﬁrms the positive impact of past proﬁt margin on innovation (see table
11 bis).
Finally, if the cash ﬂow variable and the past operating proﬁtm a r g i na r ei n -
troduced together, as these two variables are strongly related, we do not obtain
signiﬁcant eﬀects any more (column 3 of table 11).
4.1.3 Company risk indicator
Finally, we use a latest proxy for ﬁnancing constraints: the company risk indicator
of the Banque de France (named the industry score). As mentioned earlier, it is an
indicator of the ﬁrm’s risk based on accounting information. It is constructed as a
combination of symptomatic risk ratios. Thus, it is not established by expert judge-
ments like a credit rating index. This indicator decreases with the risk of the ﬁrm. We
get a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect of the company risk indicator: unsurprisingly, ﬁrms
that enjoy a better risk indicator are more likely to implement innovative projects
(table 12).
If we add our previous accounting variables in this regression (cash-ﬂow, proﬁt
margin, banking debt and own ﬁnancing ratio), they are not signiﬁcant and the risk
indicator becomes non signiﬁcant, too. It may be easily explained by the redundancy
of information carried by the accounting ratios and the risk indicator.









































6As a conclusion, the estimations with proxies of ﬁnancial constraints may lead to
think that ﬁnancing problems play a signiﬁcant role for innovation. We have found
that large ﬁrms are more likely to implement innovative projects than smaller ones.
It can be explained by their better relations with external providers of funds as well
as by their stronger capacity to amortize innovation sunk costs. In addition, we
have obtained a weak but strong signiﬁcant eﬀect of cash-ﬂow on the propensity to
innovate. Moreover, we have emphasized the signiﬁcant role of past banking debt
and economic performances. The eﬀect of these accounting and ﬁnancial variables
have been conﬁrmed by the company risk indicator.
Now, let us see what are the results obtained with our direct indicator of the
existence of ﬁnancial constraints for innovation.
4.2 The direct measure of the existence of ﬁnancing constraints
As explained in section 3.2, the measure of the existence of ﬁnancing constraints
given by the FIT survey is a qualitative indicator. It reﬂects the speciﬁc ﬁnancing
problems of innovation within the ﬁrm whereas our previous proxies were related to
the global ﬁnancial situation of the ﬁrm. The question of the endogeneity of the
ﬁnancial constraint variable is then highly relevant. First, there are many reasons
to suspect that the decision of undertaking innovative projects and the probability
of facing ﬁnancing constraints are both aﬀected by unobservable heterogeneity. The
uncertainty associated with the output of the innovative project or the eventual con-
ﬁdentiality of the project for strategic reasons are unobservable ﬁrm’s speciﬁcr i s k
factors which may create or worsen ﬁnancial constraints. In addition, we have no
information concerning the duration needed to bring the innovative project onto the
market whereas this factor may have an eﬀect both on the innovation decision and on
the likelihood of facing ﬁnancing problems. Second, the decision to implement inno-
vative projects and the likelihood of facing ﬁnancing constraints for these innovative
projects have probably to be envisaged as simultaneous questions. With our data,
this problem of simultaneity is likely to be reinforced by the fact that the survey
period includes three years and we observe the innovation decision and the ﬁnancial
obstacles globally for this three years.
From the econometric point of view, a standard probit is not relevant in the case
of qualitative endogenous explanatory variables. Thus, we propose to estimate si-
multaneously the likelihood to implement innovative projects and the probabilities of
facing ﬁnancial constraints by a recursive bivariate probit model (Greene 1998). Such
a speciﬁcation was previously used by Ploetscher and Rottmann (2002) to emphasize
t h er o l eo fﬁnancial constraints on investment.
4.2.1 A qualitative simultaneous model
We consider the decision to innovate and the likelihood of facing ﬁnancial constraints
as simultaneous questions. Each variable is likely to aﬀect the other one: the existence
of ﬁnancing constraints by reducing the likelihood to implement innovative projects









































6accounting for these relations is:
½
y∗
1i = x1iβ1 + γ1y2i + ε1i
y∗




2i represent respectively the expected return of ﬁrm’s innovative
projects and the (unobservable) severity of ﬁnancial constraints; x1i and x2i are
exogenous factors explaining the decision to innovate and the existence of ﬁnancing
constraints. Thanks to the survey we use, we know whether or not the ﬁrm undertook













Unfortunately, this model is inconsistent (Maddala 1983, Gouriéroux et al. 1980,
Lewbel 2005, Hajivassiliou 2005) and some restrictions are needed on the coeﬃcients
to be logically consistent. These conditions for logical consistency have been examined
by previously cited authors. They show that this model is logically consistent if and
only if γ1 or γ2 is set equal to zero. Here we consider the model obtained by setting
γ2 equal to zero: ½
y∗
1i = x1iβ1 + γ1y2i + ε1i
y∗
2i = x2iβ2 + ε2i
(3)
Concerning the identiﬁcation of estimated parameters, some conditions has to be
imposed, too. As y∗
1i and y∗
2i are observed as dichotomous variables, it is necessary to
adopt the standard normalization of the variance of the errors (for instance see Train
2003). We assume that the error terms are independently and identically distributed
as bivariate normal with variance equals to one and a correlation coeﬃcient between















No additional restrictions on the parameters are needed to achieve the identiﬁca-
tion of this bivariate probit model with endogenous dummy regressor (Wilde 2000,
Monfardini and Radice 2006). Moreover, this was demonstrated by Heckman (1978)
in a more general context11.
11There is some confusion about this question because of Maddala’s assertion (1983, p 222). He
states that the parameters of the ﬁrst equation are not identiﬁed if there is no exclusion restriction
on the exogenous variables (as in the linear case). But Wilde (2000) shows that this is only true
in the simple example of Maddala’s book where x2i and x1i are both constants. Wilde shows that
identiﬁcation in the simultaneous probit case is achieved as soon as both equations of the model
contain a varying exogenous regressor (and he takes exemple of a dichotomous variable entering
both equations). However, as examined by Monfardini and Radice (2006), without instruments, the
identiﬁcation of the parameters of the ﬁrst equation strongly relies on the functional form of the










































6From the econometric point of view, the endogenous nature of y2 in the ﬁrst
equation of (3) does not modify the likelihood of the standard bivariate probit
(Greene 1998, 2003). It is due to the fact that the joint probability (for instance
Pr(y1 =1 ,y 2 =1 ) ) which enters in the likelihood without endogeneity problem is
equal to the product of the conditional and marginal probabilities (Pr(y1 =1 |y2 =1 ) ∗
Pr(y2 =1 )in the likelihood where y2 is an endogenous explanatory variable for the
ﬁrst equation :
Pr(y1 =1 ,y 2 =1 )=P r (y1 =1 |y2 =1 )∗ Pr( y2 =1 )
=
Φ2 (x1β1 + γy2,x 2β2,ρ)
Φ(x2β2)
∗ Φ(x2β2) (4)
= Φ2 (x1β1 + γ1y2,x 2β2,ρ)
where Φ2 is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal distrib-
ution and Φ(.) is the univariate normal cumulative distribution function.
Then, in the recursive bivariate probit, the probabilities of each events:
- being innovative and ﬁnancially constrained (y1i =1 ,y 2i =1 ) ,
- being innovative and ﬁnancially unconstrained (y1i =1 ,y 2i =0 ) ,
- not being innovative but being ﬁnancially constrained (y1i =0 ,y 2i =1 ) ,
- not being innovative nor ﬁnancially constrained (y1i =0 ,y 2i =0 )
are just given by the value of the bivariate normal cumulative distribution func-
tion, like in a standard bivariate probit model without endogeneity.
These probabilities are :
Pr(y1 =1 ,y 2 =1 )=Φ2 (x1β1 + γ1,x 2β2,ρ)
Pr(y1 =1 ,y 2 =0 )=Φ2 (x1β1,−(x2β2),−ρ)
Pr(y1 =0 ,y 2 =1 )=Φ2 (−(x1β1 + γ1),x 2β2,−ρ)
Pr(y1 =0 ,y 2 =0 )=Φ2 (−(x1β1),−(x2β2),ρ)
The correlation coeﬃcient ρ between the disturbances accounts for the possible
existence of omitted or unobservable factors which may aﬀect simultaneously the
decision to innovate and the likelihood of facing ﬁnancing constraints. If ρ =0 ,
y2i is not correlated with the error term ε1i. In this case, the two equations could
be estimated separately as univariate probit equations. Whereas, if ρ 6=0 ,aj o i n t
estimation is required to obtain consistent estimates.
The calculation of the marginal eﬀects in the recursive bivariate probit model is
shown in Greene (1998). For a continuous variable which enters in both equations
(for instance, ﬁrm’s size), the total eﬀect on the probability of undertaking innovative
projects is the sum of a direct eﬀect (due to Pr(y1|y2,x1)) and an indirect eﬀect
(through Pr(y2|x2)). For a qualitative variable the marginal eﬀect is measured by
the diﬀerence between the conditional probabilities. For example, the marginal eﬀect










































6Pr(y1 =1 |y2 =1 ,x 1,x 2) − Pr(y1 =1 |y2 =0 ,x 1,x 2)
=





To deﬁne the explanatory variables x1 of the innovation equation we try to have
a similar speciﬁcation as Crépon et al. (1998). Thus, we consider the same list of
explanatory variables as in section 4.1.1 (ﬁrm’s size, its market share, technology
push indicators and industry dummies) and, of course, we add the dummy reﬂecting
the existence of ﬁnancial constraints.
Concerning the ﬁnancial constraint equation, the explanatory factors x2 are es-
sentially the risk associated with the investment and the asymmetric informational
problems between the ﬁrm and external investors. Thus, we include the following
variables in the ﬁnancial constraint equation:
- The size of the ﬁrm is a widespread measure of information asymmetries. Large
ﬁrm are more renowned, it is easier to obtain indications about their activities, about
their performances or their managers’ education. Consequently, the size of the ﬁrm
(measured by the log of the number of employees) is expected to have a negative
impact on the probability of facing ﬁnancial constraints.
- The importance of collateral value that a ﬁrm is able to engage to obtain a
loan is another risk factor measured by external investors. It may be easier for ﬁrm
with strong collateral value to borrow from external investors. Consequently, the
collateral variable may have a negative impact on the probability of facing ﬁnancing
constraints.
- The importance of own ﬁnancing is a positive indication concerning the ﬁnancing
reliability, whereas too high ﬁnancial debt seems as a weakness of the balance sheet
structure. So, the two ratios related to the ex ante ﬁnancing structure may have
opposite eﬀects on the probability of facing ﬁnancial constraints: a negative one for
the own ﬁnancing ratio and a positive one for the bank loans ratio.
- Finally, we control for diﬀerences about risk across sectors by including sector
dummies. Like for the innovation equation, we take the manufacture of electrical
and electronic equipment as reference. This sector presents the higher proportion of
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. So, the sector dummies are expected to have negative
signs.
4.2.2 Estimation results
The likelihood of undertaking innovative projects and the probability of facing ﬁ-
nancial constraints have been estimated i) separately (table 13, column 1) and ii)
simultaneously by allowing a correlation between the errors of the two equations
(table 13, column 2).
[INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE]
The ﬁrst striking result is the fact that we do get a strong and signiﬁcant negative









































6of the bivariate probit shows a strong correlation between the error terms of the
innovation and ﬁnancial constraints equations (ρ =0 ,574). Accounting for the endo-
geneity of the ﬁnancial constraint, we obtain a larger eﬀect of the ﬁnancial constraints,
while all other estimates remain unchanged. Consequently, elements of unobservable
heterogeneity aﬀecting both the existence of ﬁnancial constraints and the probability
to innovate play a great role and must be taken into account when we estimate the
impact of ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrms’ decision to innovate.
According to the estimated marginal eﬀect (table 14), ﬁnancing constraints are an
important innovation hampering factor: the existence of ﬁnancing constraints reduces
by 22% the likelihood to implement innovative projects, everything else being equal.
As expected, the likelihood that a ﬁrm implements innovative activities increases
with the importance of technological opportunities in its environment. In addition,
the sector indicators show strong disparities in the probability of undertaking innov-
ative projects across industries. We ﬁnd that ﬁrm size as well as its ex ante market
s h a r eh a v es i g n i ﬁcant positive impacts on the decision to implement technologically
innovative projects.
[INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE]
Concerning the likelihood of facing ﬁnancial constraints, it is also worth noticing
that the estimation also provides quite satisfactory results. A strong gross operating
proﬁt margin ratio reduces the probability of facing ﬁnancial constraints while the
banking debt ratio has a positive impact on the likelihood of being ﬁnancially con-
strained. Industry dummies reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences across sectors. This result
can be interpreted as reﬂecting the existence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences concerning the
risk of the various manufacturing sectors.
The estimations in table 13 do not reveal signiﬁcant eﬀects of ﬁrm size and of
the amount of collateral. To check for a possible redundancy problem due to the
introduction of both variables, we run the estimations without the collateral (table
15, column 1), but we do not obtain a signiﬁcant eﬀect of ﬁrm size on the probability
of facing ﬁnancial constraints. However, the eﬀect of ﬁrm’s size in absolute terms on
innovation is mainly justify in the literature by ﬁnancing reasons (Cohen and Keppler,
1996). Here, the existence of ﬁnancing problems is already taken into account by the
qualitative variable, thus, we estimate ﬁrm’s probability to implement innovative
projects without using ﬁrm’s size as explanatory variable (table 15, column 2).
By doing that, we get a signiﬁcant eﬀect of ﬁrm size on the likelihood of fac-
ing ﬁnancial constraints. Moreover, the absolute value of the estimated coeﬃcient
associated with the ﬁnancing constraint variable increases from -1.306 to -1.473.
[INSERT TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE]
As a conclusion, the existence of ﬁnancing constraints aﬀects signiﬁcantly ﬁrms
decision to engage into innovative activities. The probability of facing ﬁnancing
problems for innovation decreases with ﬁrm size. It also depends on ﬁrm ex ante
ﬁnancing structure, on its past economic performances and on ﬁrm industry sector.










































64.3 Some robustness tests
4.3.1 Sample deﬁnition: estimation on the full sample
All previous estimations are obtained with the subsample containing only potentially
innovative ﬁrms. Here, we want to check if our results are modiﬁed when we run the
regressions on the full sample (ie, by including the ﬁrms with type 5).
The results presented in table 16 conﬁrm that ﬁnancial constraints signiﬁcantly
reduce the likelihood to implement innovative project. By estimating simultaneously
both equations (column 2 of table 16), we ﬁnd a negative signiﬁcant eﬀect of the ex-
istence of ﬁnancing constraints on the likelihood to implement innovative projects on
the full sample. This estimation conﬁrms the strong correlation between the distur-
bances of the two equations (ρ =0 .604). If we ignore it, we would obtain an estimate
so biased that it would lead to a surprising and incoherent result: a signiﬁcant pos-
itive eﬀect of the ﬁnancial constraint (column 1 of table 16) on innovation. Thus,
the estimation on the full sample conﬁrms that the endogenity problem between the
innovation decision and the existence of ﬁnancial constraints is highly relevant and
that it must be taken into account in the estimation procedure.
[INSERT TABLE 16 HERE]
4.3.2 Firm’s size: are medium sized ﬁrms more aﬀected by ﬁnancing
problems?
In our previous regressions, ﬁrm’s size is measured by a continue variable (the log-
arithm of the number of employees) while only ﬁrms with a speciﬁcs i z em a yf a c e
ﬁnancing constraints. For instance, Passet and Du Tertre (2005) argue that ﬁnancing
constraints may be particularly relevant for medium sized ﬁrms. They emphasized
that the French state expenditure on R&D is focused on large and small ﬁrms. On
the one hand, large ﬁrms beneﬁt from public funds, essentially for military defense or
through important technology programs of the European Union. On the other hand,
small ﬁrms may use subsidized loans or advances which have to be paid oﬀ only if
the project becomes successful. In addition, young innovative ﬁrms may enjoy an
attractive ﬁscal policy12. Thus, medium sized ﬁrms are relatively neglected by the
public expenditure for innovation.
To check for this possibility, we include alternatively a quadratic term for ﬁrm
size and we use a qualitative measure of size (see table 17).
By including the quadratic size term we do not ﬁnd that it has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
(columns 2 and 4 of table 17). Consequently, we do not ﬁnd that the link between
the probability of having ﬁnancing constraints for innovation and ﬁrm size may be
characterized by an U inverted relationship for established ﬁrms.
To examine by another way the existence of a speciﬁc ﬁnancing problems for
medium sized ﬁrms we deﬁne three categories:
-s m a l ls i z e( ﬁrms with less than 100 employees)










































6- medium size (ﬁrms having between 100 and 500 employees)
- large size (ﬁrms with more than 500 employees)
We take small size as reference. Our results are similar as those obtained with
t h ec o n t i n u ev a r i a b l e :w eﬁnd that ﬁnancing problems are less likely to occur when
ﬁrm’s size increases, but the discrete measure of ﬁrm size does not reveal a speciﬁc
problem for medium sized ﬁrms (column 3 of table 17).
[INSERT TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE]
4.3.3 Firm’s collateral and the role of the group aﬃliation
It is particularly diﬃcult to deﬁne innovative ﬁrm’s collateral. We used the amount
of tangible assets and we do not ﬁnd that it has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability
of facing ﬁnancial constraints (table 13). But tangible assets may be ﬁrm’s speciﬁc
due to the ﬁrm’s innovative character. We explore an alternative measure of ﬁrm’s
ability to repay its creditors: a dummy variable identifying whether the ﬁrm belongs
to a group or not. The head of group may provide guarantees for its subsidiary
companies. Thus, from the creditors’ point of view, subsidiary companies may oﬀer
more guarantees than independent ﬁrms. Another argument for taking into account
ﬁrm’s membership of a group is the possible role played by funds given by the head of
the group (Kremp and Sevestre 2000). These ﬁnancing source may weaken the need
for external funds and may reduce ﬁrm’s probability of facing ﬁnancing constraints for
its innovative projects. Thus, we introduce this dummy variable identifying whether
the ﬁrm belongs to a group or not. We perform other checks by including cross
variables (size*groupe or collateral*groupe) to account for a likely diﬀerent eﬀect of
the size or of the collateral for the ﬁrms belonging to a group on the probability of
facing ﬁnancing constraints. Nevertheless, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
group aﬃl i a t i o no nt h ee x i s t e n c eo fﬁnancial constraints for innovation (table 18).
This can probably be explained by the fact that our group indicator is a too crude
measure. To properly take into account the role of the ﬁnancings from the group,
more detailed information about the group structure would be necessary. This cannot
be envisaged here with the data we used. However, it remains an interesting question
to be studied in future research.
[INSERT TABLE 18 ABOUT HERE]
5C O N C L U S I O N
In this paper, we estimate the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on the decision to engage
into innovative activities. We use a qualitative indicator of the existence of ﬁnancial
constraints based on ﬁrm’s own assessment which allows to avoid the traditional
problems linked to the interpretation of cash-ﬂow eﬀects.
This paper shows that the likelihood that a ﬁrm will implement innovative projects
is signiﬁcantly reduced by the existence of ﬁnancing constraints. This reduction is
estimated to amount to 22.3% everything else being equal. Moreover, we obtain the









































6to innovate, the propensity to innovate also depends on technology opportunities in
ﬁrm’s environment.
By considering the existence of ﬁnancing constraints as endogenous to the inno-
vation decision, we stress the role played by some factors on the existence of ﬁnancial
constraints. We ﬁnd that the likelihood that a ﬁrm faces ﬁnancial constraints for its
innovative projects decreases with ﬁrm’s size. Financing problems for innovation are
also explained by ﬁrm ex ante ﬁnancing structure, by its past economic performances
a n db ys e c t o r - b a s e df a c t o r s .
To better evaluate the origin of these ﬁnancing constraints, it would be interesting
to have more information about the projects themselves (in particular concerning the
duration of the project from the R&D stage to the introduction of the output onto
the market). Finally, to go deeper into this question of ﬁnancing for innovation in
established ﬁrms, future research would have to examine the role of the ﬁnancing
within the company for ﬁrms belonging to a group structure.
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66A p p e n d i c e s
6.1 Description of the sample
Table 1. Details of the financial obstacles
% of financially constrained firms with :
Type of financial constraints
No financing source 88.00
Slowness in the setting up of  the financing 44.86
interest rate too high 21.71
Details by number of financial constraints faced
Only one type of financial constraint 64.00
No financing source 52.29
Slowness in the setting up of  the financing 10.57
interest rate too high 1.14
Two types of financial constraints 16.85
No financing source
 +Slowness in the setting up of  the financing 15.43
No financing source
 +interest rate too high 1.14
Slowness in the setting up of  the financing
 + interest rate too high 0.28
Three types of financial constraints 19.15
Consequences of financial constraints
project(s) delayed 44.86
project(s) abandonned 15.14
project(s) non started 55.43
Note:The modes of financing constraints are not exclusive. Furthermore, a firm may have several 









































6Table 2. Number of ﬁrms in the sample
Potentially innovative ﬁrms Others Total
(Type 5)
Number of ﬁrms Financially Financially
constrained unconstrained
With implemented innovative projects 198 613 - 811
Without innovative activities 112 159 858 1129
Total 310 772 858 1940
Table 3. Firms'size (Number of employees)
Firms without
 innovative project
Constrained  Unconstrained Constrained  Unconstrained
(type 1 ) (type 2) (type 3) (type 4) (type 5)
Mean 313.23 357.61 137.47 125.78 153.54
Lower quartile 60 74 39.5 42 42
Median 146 175 70.5 73 78
Upper quartile 441 520 145.5 139 160
Firms with non started projects
Potentially innovative firms
Firms with implemented innovative projects
Table 4. Sample composition
Number of firms  % of firms with  % of financially
Industry innovative projects  constrained firms
(in the sample) (within the sector) (within the sector)
Textiles and textile products 155 27.52 12.08
Leather and leather products 45 28.89 11.11
Wood and wood products 59 26.79 8.93
Pulp, paper and paper products, publishing and printing 211 29.44 12.18
Chemicals industry 121 58.41 11.5
Rubber and plastics 139 43.28 14.93
Other non-metalic mineral products  101 43.75 17.71
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 458 37.81 17.00
Machinery and equipment 213 65.4 17.54
Electrical and electronic equipment 218 68.02 30.18
Transport equipment 102 64.29 27.68
Other manufacturing industries 118 41.69 12.04










































Table 5. Average indicator of company risk (source: Banque de France)
Others
Constrained  Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
(type 1) (type 2) (type 3) (type 4) (type 5)
All sample 0.435 1.312 0.049 0.808 0.930
O0nly potentially innovative firms 0.442 1.131 0.041 0.840  -
Note: Average score calculated by using variance analysis for a given size and industry
Calculated means are significantly different at the 1% level according to firms' type
Potentially innovative firms
Firms without innovative activities Firms with implemented innovative project(s)
Table 6. Ratios (% of added value)
Others
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained  Unconstrained
(type 1) (type 2) (type 3) (type 4) (type 5)
Immaterial expenditure*** 6.193 4.690 4.150 4.008 3.778
 - R&D*** 2.682 1.333 1.086 0.777 0.768
 - Patenting 0.423 0.295 0.240 0.500 0.233
 - Training 0.431 0.416 0.479 0.393 0.402
 - Advertising costs 2.514 2.568 2.320 2.302 2.278
 - Business 0.142 0.077 0.022 0.035 0.096
Gross operating profit margin *** 13.920 22.632 6.837 18.397 18.637
Financial fees*** 5.259 3.254 5.361 3.237 3.408
Self financing capacity*** 11.479 16.920 3.183 14.872 14.576
Dividends distribution** 2.404 4.967 2.598 3.072 4.639
Average ratio calculated by using variance analysis for a given size and industry
*/**/*** indicates significant difference for the type of firm at the 10%/5%/1% level.
Potentially innovative firms









































6Table 7. Firms' financing structure (% of totale ressources)
Others
Constrained  Unconstrained Constrained  Unconstrained
(type 1) (type 2) (type 3) (type 4) (type 5)
Own financing*** 73.203 78.808 67.118 74.808 78.273
Market financing 0.153 0.233 0.166 0.353 0.135
Financial debt*** 26.787 21.192 32.881 25.551 21.727
Details of the financial debt
Bank loans*** 16.983 13.032 21.951 16.802 14.053
 - Long-term bank loans*** 8.159 7.070 8.206 8.555 7.223
 - Short-term bank loans*** 8.823 5.961 13.744 8.245 6.830
Financing by group companies  6.992 5.637 6.283 6.254 5.546
Other extra-group financial debt*** 2.668 2.289 4.483 2.143 1.992
Average ratio calculated by using variance analysis for a given size and industry
*/**/*** indicates significant difference for the type of firm at the 10%/5%/1% level.
Potentially innovative firms
Firms without innovative activities Firms with implemented innovative projects
6.3 Deﬁnitions
Table 8: Deﬁnition of variables
Name Type Deﬁnition
Financial constraints Discrete =1 if the ﬁrm face ﬁnancial constraints,=0 otherwise
Size Continue log (number of employees)
Small Size Discrete =1 if there is less than 100 employees, =0 otherwise (reference)
Medium Size Discrete =1 if there is between 100 and 500 employees, =0 otherwise
Large Size Discrete =1 if there is more than 500 employees, =0 otherwise
Market share Continue sales of the ﬁrm
sales of the sector × 100
Banking debt ratio Continue
Banking debt
(Own ﬁnancing+Market Financing+Financial debt) × 100
Own ﬁnancing ratio Continue
Own ﬁnancing
(Own ﬁnancing+Market Financing+Financial debt) × 100
Gross operating proﬁt margin Continue EBDIT
Added value × 100
Collateral Continue log(tangible assets)
Technology push : Discrete
TP1 =1 if ﬁrm’s market is technologically not innovative
(mode of reference)
TP2 =1 if ﬁrm’s market is technologically weakly innovative,
TP3 =1 if ﬁrm’s market is technologically moderately innovative
TP4 =1 if ﬁrm’s market is technologically strongly innovative
Sector indicators Discrete
Groupe Discrete =1 if the ﬁrm belongs to a company group, =0 otherwise









































6firm size as proxy for financial constraints
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Constant -1.222 *** 0.342 -1.220 *** 0.343
 log(R&D)  -  - 0.016 0.044
Dummy R&D  -  - 0.133 0.208
Size 0.274 *** 0.056 0.257 *** 0.057
Market share 0.758 ** 0.299 0.709 ** 0.299
TP4 1.198 *** 0.239 1.200 *** 0.239
TP3 0.813 *** 0.196 0.828 *** 0.197
TP2 0.390 ** 0.191 0.411 ** 0.191
DB -0.401 * 0.211 -0.362 * 0.213
DC -0.184 0.347 -0.145 0.348
DD -0.202 0.301 -0.189 0.301
DE -0.228 0.199 -0.192 0.200
DG -0.451 * 0.231 -0.454 ** 0.232
DH -0.497 ** 0.211 -0.476 ** 0.212
DI -0.458 ** 0.228 -0.431 * 0.229
DJ -0.020 0.167 -0.003 0.167
DK 0.316 0.192 0.318 0.193
DM 0.035 0.235 0.037 0.236
DN -0.326 0.217 -0.304 0.218
Log likelihood fonctions -516.208 -514.536
R² Mac Fadden 0.152 0.155
Number of firms 1082 1082
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10%/5%/1% levels









































6Table 10. Propensity to innovate with firm size as proxy for financial constraints:
accounting for measurement errors of R&D (2SCML )
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Innovation equation (probit)
Constant -3.434 *** 0.492 -4.469 *** 0.508
 log(R&D) 1.461 *** 0.226 2.070 *** 0.221
Dummy R&D 0.057 0.231 0.072 0.220
Size 0.264 *** 0.061 0.261 *** 0.060
Market share 0.065 0.259 0.627 ** 0.305
TP4 0.853 *** 0.285 0.323 0.265
TP3 0.595 *** 0.229 0.358 * 0.212
TP2 0.301 0.220 0.183 0.204
DB 1.569 *** 0.367 2.165 *** 0.347
DC 1.295 *** 0.423 2.008 *** 0.432
DD 0.952 ** 0.370 1.710 *** 0.377
DE 1.895 *** 0.393 2.553 *** 0.358
DG -0.880 *** 0.271 -1.761 *** 0.287
DH -0.047 0.237 0.385 0.241
DI 0.092 0.275 0.177 0.251
DJ 0.896 *** 0.232 1.401 *** 0.231
DK 0.161 0.217 0.175 0.204
DM -0.638 ** 0.277 -0.563 ** 0.250
DN 0.320 0.262 0.668 *** 0.249
Residuals R&D -1.446 *** 0.220 -2.046 *** 0.215
Log likelihood fonctions -408.333 -456.741
R² Mac Fadden 0.216 0.250
log(R&D investment) equation (OLS)
Constant 1.021 ** 0.531 1.023 ** 0.510
Sales rate (1995-1996) 0.028 *** 0.004  - -
Firm4 1.065 ** 0.513 1.303 *** 0.492
Firm3 0.538 0.517 0.519 0.497
Firm2 0.609 0.498 0.763 0.479
DB -1.293 *** 0.395 -1.250 *** 0.379
DC -0.961 0.615 -1.021 0.627
DD -0.794 0.586 -1.026 * 0.564
DE -1.471 *** 0.366 -1.288 *** 0.348
DG 0.313 0.386 0.629 ** 0.357
DH -0.292 0.358 -0.434 0.345
DI -0.531 0.421 -0.322 0.395
DJ -0.653 ** 0.290 -0.713 *** 0.270
DK 0.088 0.306 0.034 0.292
DM 0.401 0.392 0.289 0.368
DN -0.508 0.393 -0.505 0.378
R² 0 .109  0.064
Number of firms 905 1082









































6Table 11. Propensity to innovate (Probit):
 Cash-flow and other proxies as financial constraints indicators 
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Constant -1.335 *** 0.344 -1.222 *** 0.390 -1.220 *** 0.390
Size 0.285 *** 0.057 0.271 *** 0.057 0.272 *** 0.057
Market share 0.636 ** 0.291 0.594 ** 0.286 0.585 ** 0.285
TP4 1.187 *** 0.240 1.188 *** 0.242 1.185 *** 0.242
TP3 0.783 *** 0.197 0.762 *** 0.198 0.759 *** 0.198
TP2 0.355 ** 0.191 0.337 * 0.192 0.333 * 0.192
Cash-flow 0.008 *** 0.002  -  -  0.002 0.003
Banking debt  -  - -0.007 ** 0.003 -0.007 ** 0.003
Own financing  -  - 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
Gross operating profit margin  -  - 0.007 *** 0.002 0.005 0.003
DB -0.395 * 0.212 -0.390 * 0.214 -0.393 * 0.214
DC -0.214 0.346 -0.287 0.348 -0.284 0.348
DD -0.172 0.302 -0.065 0.307 -0.061 0.307
DE -0.248 0.200 -0.189 0.203 -0.193 0.203
DG -0.412 * 0.231 -0.474 ** 0.232 -0.465 ** 0.232
DH -0.505 ** 0.211 -0.462 ** 0.213 -0.464 ** 0.213
DI -0.432 * 0.229 -0.426 * 0.232 -0.422 * 0.232
DJ -0.026 0.167 0.013 0.169 0.012 0.169
DK 0.364 * 0.195 0.333 * 0.195 0.340 * 0.196
DM 0.064 0.238 0.102 0.242 0.103 0.242
DN -0.334 0.218 -0.354 0.218 -0.352 0.218
Log likelihood fonctions -510.933 -504.874 -504.710
R² Mac Fadden 0.161 0.171 0.171
Number of firms 1082 1082 1082









































6Table 11 bis. Propensity to innovate (2SCML) with proxies as financial constraints indicators: 
controlling for the likely endogenity of the profit margin ratio
2SCLM Probit on this sample
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Innovation equation (probit)
Constant -1.640 *** 0.435 -1.412 *** 0.409
Size 0.297 *** 0.059 0.295 *** 0.060
Market share 0.527 * 0.288 0.560 * 0.291
TP4 1.258 *** 0.253 1.276 *** 0.253
TP3 0.788 *** 0.205 0.793 *** 0.205
TP2 0.362 * 0.200 0.373 * 0.199
Banking debt -0.006 * 0.003 -0.006 * 0.003
Own financing 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Gross operating profit margin 0.024 ** 0.011 0.007 *** 0.003
DB -0.313 0.223 -0.323 0.222
DC -0.403 0.361 -0.269 0.352
DD -0.029 0.318 0.006 0.318
DE -0.306 0.223 -0.191 0.210
DG -0.612 ** 0.251 -0.515 ** 0.244
DH -0.529 ** 0.236 -0.411 * 0.223
DI -0.548 ** 0.244 -0.484 ** 0.240
DJ -0.059 0.183 0.010 0.177
DK 0.340 0.207 0.387 * 0.205
DM 0.041 0.250 0.078 0.249
DN -0.414 * 0.230 -0.338 0.225
Residuals profit margin -0.018 0.011  -  -
Log likelihood fonctions -464.660 -466.106
R² Mac Fadden 0.179 0.176
Profit margin equation (OLS)
Constant 12.235 *** 1.618
Self financing capacity (1995) 0.223 *** 0.025
Investment rate (1995) -0.033 *** 0.006
DB 0.659 2.872
DC 8.174 * 4.588
DD 1.137 4.222
DE 5.476 ** 2.599
DG 5.630 ** 2.758







Number of firms 1005 1005
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10%/5%/1% levels
Note: The sample is restricted to 1005 firms because we do not have 








































6Table 12. Propensity to innovate (probit):
 Banque de France risk indicator as proxy for financing problems
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Constant -1.356 *** 0.344 -1.214 ** 0.500
Size 0.281 *** 0.057 0.275 *** 0.057
Market share 0.664 ** 0.288 0.598 ** 0.285
TP4 1.190 *** 0.241 1.184 *** 0.242
TP3 0.789 *** 0.197 0.766 *** 0.198
TP2 0.367 * 0.191 0.338 * 0.192
Risk indicator 0.160 *** 0.035 0.093 * 0.050
cash-flow  -  - 0.002 0.003
Banking debt  -  - -0.005 0.005
Own financing  -  - 0.000 0.004
Gross operating profit margin  -  - 0.003 0.004
DB -0.402 * 0.213 -0.400 * 0.214
DC -0.291 0.347 -0.301 0.348
DD -0.084 0.306 -0.062 0.308
DE -0.220 0.200 -0.219 0.201
DG -0.488 ** 0.232 -0.480 ** 0.233
DH -0.451 ** 0.212 -0.465 ** 0.212
DI -0.387 * 0.232 -0.408 * 0.232
DJ 0.008 0.168 0.008 0.169
DK 0.319 0.194 0.333 * 0.196
DM 0.132 0.242 0.129 0.244
DN -0.343 0.218 -0.347 0.218
Log likelihood fonctions -505.408 -503.274
R² Mac Fadden 0.170 0.174
Number of firms 1082 1082









































6Table 13. Innovation and financing constraints estimations with  qualitative indicator
Single equations Bivariate probit
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Index equation for undertaking innovative project(s)
Constant -0,879 ** 0,356 -0,292 0,388
Size 0,283 *** 0,058 0,232 *** 0,060
Market share 0,698 ** 0,295 0,643 *** 0,240
TP4 1,343 *** 0,249 1,210 *** 0,238
TP3 0,871 *** 0,203 0,766 *** 0,188
TP2 0,431 ** 0,197 0,363 ** 0,179
Financial constraints -0,415 *** 0,109 -1,290 *** 0,269
Excessive economic risk -0,130 0,099 -0,127 0,094
Lack of qualified employees -0,070 0,100 -0,060 0,095
Innovation costs too high -0,417 *** 0,098 -0,381 *** 0,095
Excessive get-out clause -0,268 0,259 -0,246 0,243
Lack of knowledge about financing 0,356 0,220 0,315 0,192
DB -0,444 ** 0,219 -0,505 ** 0,218
DC -0,238 0,3696 -0,335 0,443
DD -0,331 0,3059 -0,471 * 0,284
DE -0,272 0,2035 -0,357 * 0,190
DG -0,548 ** 0,2382 -0,708 *** 0,219
DH -0,535 ** 0,2158 -0,628 *** 0,208
DI -0,417 * 0,2325 -0,417 * 0,222
DJ 0,001 0,1716 -0,028 0,163
DK 0,299 0,197 0,157 0,199
DM 0,019 0,2391 0,000 0,226
DN -0,307 0,2228 -0,405 * 0,215
Index equation for facing financing constraints
Constant 0,458 0,417 0,457 0,410
Size -0,150 * 0,081 -0,102 0,084
Collateral amount 0,069 0,058 0,033 0,059
Banking debt ratio 0,007 0,004 0,007 * 0,004
Own financing ratio -0,007 * 0,004 -0,007 ** 0,003
Gross operating profit margin ratio -0,012 *** 0,002 -0,012 *** 0,002
DB -0,321 0,1985 -0,291 0,205
DC -0,135 0,3277 -0,097 0,327
DD -0,753 ** 0,3118 -0,751 ** 0,308
DE -0,411 ** 0,188 -0,359 * 0,187
DG -0,778 *** 0,2182 -0,747 *** 0,209
DH -0,436 ** 0,1877 -0,423 ** 0,187
DI -0,142 0,2051 -0,088 0,210
DJ -0,139 0,141 -0,103 0,147
DK -0,399 ** 0,1564 -0,358 ** 0,161
DM -0,139 0,1919 -0,126 0,206
DN -0,357 * 0,2017 -0,327 0,206





Number of firms 1082 1082









































6Table 14. Estimated marginal effects (at the sample means) on the probability 
to implement innovative projects (bivariate probit)
Direct Indirect Std.Err.
Market share 0,0940  - 0,0716
Financial constraints -0,2230 0,0294
Innovation costs too high -0,0265  - 0,0205
Size  - 0,0044 0,0025
Banking debt ratio  - -0,0002 0,0002
Own financing ratio  - 0,0004 0,0002
Gross operating profit margin ra  - 0,0004 0,0002
Table 15. Innovation and financing constraints estimations:
alternative specifications (bivariate probit)
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Index equation for undertaking innovative project(s)
Constant -0,278 0,386 0,804 *** 0,222
Size 0,231 *** 0,060  -  -
Market share 0,636 *** 0,240 1,320 *** 0,181
TP4 1,201 *** 0,237 1,176 *** 0,223
TP3 0,760 *** 0,187 0,732 *** 0,173
TP2 0,358 ** 0,179 0,339 ** 0,165
Financial constraints -1,306 *** 0,263 -1,473 *** 0,216
Excessive economic risk -0,125 0,093 -0,082 0,087
Lack of qualified employees -0,059 0,094 -0,061 0,089
Innovation costs too high -0,379 *** 0,094 -0,349 *** 0,088
Excessive get-out clause -0,247 0,242 -0,296 0,231
Lack of knowledge about financing 0,314 0,191 0,313 0,186
Index equation for facing financing constraints
Constant 0,527 0,386 0,707 * 0,372
Size -0,061 0,040 -0,099 *** 0,038
Collateral amount  -  -  -  -
Banking debt ratio 0,007 * 0,004 0,006 * 0,004
Own financing ratio -0,006 * 0,003 -0,006 * 0,003
Gross operating profit margin ratio -0,012 *** 0,002 -0,011 *** 0,002
Disturbance Correlation : rho 0,584 *** 0,166 0,697 *** 0,136
Log likelihood fonctions
Bivariate -1083.241 -1091.639
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10%/5%/1% levels









































6Table 16. Innovation and financing constraints: Estimations on the full sample
Single equations Bivariate probit
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Index equation for undertaking innovative project(s)
Constant -2,612 *** 0,213 -2,121 *** 0,278
Size 0,330 *** 0,032 0,305 *** 0,034
Market share -0,003 0,061 -0,001 0,055
TP4 1,656 *** 0,157 1,504 *** 0,170
TP3 1,189 *** 0,124 1,068 *** 0,134
TP2 0,774 *** 0,121 0,690 *** 0,121
Financial constraints 0,546 *** 0,086 -0,550 ** 0,268
DB -0,473 *** 0,151 -0,590 *** 0,148
DC -0,419 ** 0,232 -0,551 *** 0,215
DD -0,310 0,213 -0,489 ** 0,209
DE -0,497 *** 0,137 -0,621 *** 0,132
DG -0,201 0,160 -0,376 ** 0,164
DH -0,199 0,151 -0,310 ** 0,148
DI -0,267 0,170 -0,322 * 0,168
DJ -0,288 ** 0,116 -0,369 *** 0,114
DK 0,267 ** 0,134 0,149 0,137
DM -0,042 0,167 -0,083 0,162
DN -0,187 0,161 -0,312 * 0,166
Index equation for facing financing constraints
Constant -0,868 *** 0,243 -0,816 *** 0,237
Size -0,054 0,067 -0,002 0,070
Collateral amount 0,067 0,047 0,030 0,048
Banking debt ratio 0,010 *** 0,002 0,010 *** 0,002
Own financing ratio -0,003 ** 0,001 -0,003 *** 0,001
Gross operating profit margin -0,007 *** 0,002 -0,008 *** 0,002
DB -0,574 *** 0,162 -0,549 *** 0,162
DC -0,452 *** 0,264 -0,452 * 0,242
DD -0,876 *** 0,256 -0,888 *** 0,257
DE -0,643 *** 0,153 -0,629 *** 0,155
DG -0,726 *** 0,194 -0,685 *** 0,189
DH -0,484 *** 0,165 -0,443 *** 0,164
DI -0,286 0,175 -0,234 0,176
DJ -0,430 *** 0,119 -0,405 *** 0,122
DK -0,339 ** 0,140 -0,303 ** 0,142
DM -0,194 0,170 -0,204 0,183
DN -0,449 *** 0,173 -0,405 ** 0,172




Bivariate model  -1858.083     
Number of firms 1940 1940









































6Table 17 . Other measures of firm' size:
 adding a quadratic term or using a qualitative measure
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Index equation for undertaking innovative project(s)
Constant 0,766 *** 0,228 0,569 *** 0,208
Market share 1,377 *** 0,180 1,302 *** 0,184
TP4 1,212 *** 0,227 1,177 *** 0,217
TP3 0,758 *** 0,177 0,754 *** 0,169
TP2 0,362 *** 0,170 0,362 ** 0,160
Financial constraints -1,388 *** 0,235 -1,537 *** 0,207
Index equation for facing financing constraints
Constant 0,197 0,170 0,710 ** 0,304
Large size -0,295 ** 0,128  - -
Medium size -0,168 * 0,092  - -
Size  - --0,128 *** 0,049
Size²  - - 0,18 e-7 0,10 e-6
Banking debt ratio 0,007 *** 0,003 0,006 ** 0,003
Own financing ratio -0,011 *** 0,003 -0,011 *** 0,003
Gross operating profit margin -0,009 *** 0,002 -0,009 *** 0,002
Disturbance Correlation : rho 0,650 *** 150,000 0,680 *** 0,136
Log likelihood fonctions -1084.909 -1094.448
Number of firms 1082 1082
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10%/5%/1% levels
"Small size" is the mode of reference









































6Table 18. The role of the group affiliation
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Index equation for undertaking innovative project(s)
Constant 0,717 *** 0,214 -0,687 * 0,357 0,726 *** 0,213 0,718 *** 0,214
Size  -   -  0,303 *** 0,051  -   -   -   - 
Size*groupe  -   -  0,096 0,064  -   -   -   - 
Market share 1,313 *** 0,179 1,314 *** 0,179 1,317 *** 0,178 1,312 *** 0,179
TP4 1,205 *** 0,223 1,230 *** 0,239 1,195 *** 0,222 1,204 *** 0,223
TP3 0,750 *** 0,173 0,778 *** 0,190 0,742 *** 0,172 0,750 *** 0,173
TP2 0,372 ** 0,165 0,398 ** 0,182 0,366 ** 0,164 0,371 ** 0,165
Financial constraints -1,411 *** 0,222 -1,222 *** 0,264 -1,420 *** 0,217 -1,413 *** 0,221
Index equation for facing financing constraints
Constant 0,654 ** 0,280 0,505 * 0,292 0,758 ** 0,324 0,646 ** 0,277
Size -0,113 *** 0,040 -0,078 * 0,042  -   -  -0,111 *** 0,039
Size*groupe -0,005 0,034 0,009 0,034  -   -   -   - 
collateral amount  -   -   -   -  -0,077 *** 0,029  -   - 
collateral amount*groupe  -   -   -   -  -0,007 0,021  -   - 
groupe  -   -   -   -   -   -  -0,068 0,216
Banking debt ratio 0,006 ** 0,003 0,006 ** 0,003 0,005 * 0,003 0,006 ** 0,003
Own financing ratio -0,011 *** 0,003 -0,012 *** 0,003 -0,012 *** 0,003 -0,011 *** 0,003
Gross operating profit margin ra -0,010 *** 0,002 -0,010 *** 0,002 -0,009 *** 0,002 -0,010 *** 0,002
Disturbance Correlation : rho 0,667 *** 0,144 0,542 *** 0,170 0,672 *** 0,139 0,669 *** 0,143
Log likelihood fonctions  -1086.354 -1079.179  -1090.528 -1086.312
Number of firms 1082 1082 1082 1082
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10%/5%/1% levels
Estimated with a bivariate probit and 12 industry dummies
41
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
1
1
5
7
1
7
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
2
2
 
N
o
v
 
2
0
0
6